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Introduction
In the last few years, a number of economists, politicians,

and pundits have argued that in the 1980's the American economy
became more tightly integrated into the world economy. By a lot
of measures, this seems to be true. For example, between 1970
and 1990 America's exports plus imports as a percentage of gross
national product rose from 12.7% to 24.9%. Similarly, during the
1980's the stock of inward foreign direct investment, valued on
a historic cost basis, grew from 3 % to 8.1 % .
In particular, people often argue that American
labor-market trends have been increasingly driven by this
"globalization" of the economy. Two facts commonly pointed to
are sluggish real-wage growth and rising wage inequality between
more-skilled and less-skilled workers. Surely, the argument runs,
international linkages such as trade and foreign direct investment
must have contributed to these labor-market developments? A lot
of prima facie evidence is forwarded to support this claim. It
usually goes something like, "Because increases in trade, FDI,
and the like have accompanied these wage trends, the former
must surely have helped cause the latter. "

This belief in the globalization of the American labor
market has already played a big role in public policy. For
example, Ross Perot, who won 19% of the popular vote in the
1992 presidential election, is adamantly against free trade with
developing nations and predicts that NAFTA will rapidly push
American wages down to Mexican levels. Support for this view
nearly prevented congressional ratification of NAFTA, and it is
still strong today: the cover of a recent Business Week reads
"America's New Populism: Angry citizens are rebelling against
big government, stagnant incomes, moral decay, and the global
economy." But it is an open question whether such trade and
investment policies are warranted.
In my dissertation I try to go beyond the prima facie
evidence of globalization to investigate whether international trade
and multinational corporations influenced trends in the American
labor market during two periods: the 1980's and the antebellum
years. In each of the three chapters, my basic approach is to
articulate the theory of how trade and multinationals can affect
labor markets, and then apply this theory to the relevant data. My
main fmding is that in both the 1980's and the antebellum years,
the strong prima facie evidence pointing to a role for either trade
or multinationals in labor-market developments was not supported
by more rigorous empirical analysis. In the 1980's international
trade and multinational corporations contributed very little, if
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anything, to either sluggish real-wage growth or rising wage
inequality. Similarly, in the antebellum years strong integration
of commodity markets between the Northeast and the Midwest did
not lead to wage convergence between these regions. The overall
policy implication is that current policy proposals designed to
ameliorate the labor-market effects of the globalization of the
American economy are very likely unwarranted. Policies aiming
to increase real wages and reduce wage inequality should not
involve trade and FDI.
The first chapter, "International Trade and American
Wages in the 1980's: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup?"
was co-authored with Robert Lawrence and was published in
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1993.
Two facts about the American labor market in the 1980's
motivate this paper. First, average real wages barely grew.
Second, the wages of less-skilled Americans fell relative to those
of their more-skilled counterparts. The paper investigates the
contribution of international trade to these two developments. We
first present the standard trade theory on factor returns, and then
apply this theory to the data. Our main finding is that trade
through the standard channels seems to have contributed nothing
to either of these developments: import prices did not rise
sufficiently to restrain real wages, and the terms of trade through
the Stolper-Samuelson process did not diverge relative wages.
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Instead, trends in the domestic side of the economy seem to have
dominated the wage structure. Sluggish labor-productivity growth
in the service sector accounts for most of the sluggish real-wage
growth, and skill-biased technological change appears to account
for most of the unequal wage growth.
The second chapter, "International Trade, Multinational
Corporations, and American Wage Divergence in the 1980's,"
focuses more closely on the wage-divergence issue addressed in
the first chapter.

The literature on this wage divergence has

demonstrated that a shift in relative labor demand away from the
unskilled and toward the skilled was its main cause. However, the
literature has not adequately addressed the hypothesis that the
"globalization" of the American economy helped cause the
demand shift. This paper evaluates whether international trade or
multinational outsourcing contributed to the demand shift and
resulting wage divergence. First, the paper articulates the theory
of how trade or multinationals can shift relative labor demand. On
the trade side, it analyzes the theoretical issues more fully than the
first chapter did. The paper then analyzes the relevant data in
light of this theory. My main fmding is that neither international
trade through the Stolper-Samuelson process nor outsourcing by
multinationals contributed significantly to America's wage
divergence in the 1980's.
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The third chapter, "The Antebellum Transportation
Revolution and Factor-Price Equalization," applies the techniques
developed in the first two chapters to the antebellum labor
market. In antebellum America an extensive network of canals
and railroads was constructed which slashed transportation costs
between the Northeast and the Midwest. This "transportation
revolution" provides a nearly ideal case study of the factor-price
equalization (FPE) theorem. The paper documents that the lower
transportation costs helped equalize commodity prices across
regions. It then presents wage series which surprisingly display no
evidence of wage equalization across regions. The interesting
question then becomes why FPE didn't arise. The paper argues
that regional specialization of production in the Midwest
prevented it. To support this argument the paper presents
historical evidence that the Midwest was effectively specialized.
It then presents a simple model that shows how the nature of

regional shifts in factor demands depends on whether the region
specializes ill production. Thus, the transportation revolution was
realizing one of FPE's usual assumptions---zero trade barriers.
But the fact that a second assumption--no regional specialization
of production--was not being realized prevented the first from
equalizing factor prices.
Thus, the overall rmding of my dissertation is that in two
labor-market episodes where strong prima facie evidence pointed
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to a role for either trade or multinationals, this evidence was not
supported by more rigorous empirical analysis. In light of this,
policy aiming to restrict trade or FDI because of their believed
labor-market effects seems unwarranted.

Chapter 1

International Trade and American Wages in the
1980's: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup?

The American dream is that each generation should live
better than its predecessor. Over the century prior to 1973, real
average hourly earnings rose by 1.9 percent per year. At that rate
earnings doubled every thirty-six years, and the dream was
realized.
The dream no longer holds. Since 1973, the United States
has failed to match its historic track record. In 1973, real hourly
earnings, measured in 1982 dollars by the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) , were $8.55. By 1992 they had actually declined to
$7.43--a level that had been achieved in the late 1960's. Or
consider real hourly compensation (a more comprehensive
measure of the payments to labor): between 1973 and 1991, real
hourly compensation rose by only 5 %.
A second ominous development in the American economy
has accompanied this slump: a dramatic increase in the earnings
of skilled workers relative to those of their less-skilled
counterparts. Several economists have documented this fall in
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terms of education, experience, and job classification. For
example, Davis (1992) calculates this divergence in terms of work
experience and finds that between 1979 and 1987, the ratio of
weekly earnings of males in their forties to weekly earnings of
males in their twenties rose by 25 %. Similarly, we calculate this
divergence based on job classification and find that in
manufacturing between 1979 and 1989, the ratio of average
annual wages of non-production workers to average annual wages
of production workers rose by nearly 10 %.
These two developments--sluggish and unequal real-wage
growth--have coincided with major changes in Ari.J.erica' s
international economic relations. The coincidence of America's
accelerated integration into the world economy with its slow and
uneven wage growth makes it scarcely surprising that the former
has frequently been advanced as a primary cause of the latter. In
this paper, we try to advance the debate by a data analysis which
uses insights from theory to investigate the role of international
trade on America's recent wage performance.
In the first section of the paper, we look at the sluggish
growth of average real wages. In a large group of standard
labor-market models, as a first approximation we expect the
performance of average real wages to mirror the performance of
output per worker. At first glance, however, there appears to be
a gap between the two. From 1979 to 1991, output per worker
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grew by 10.5 % but real compensation (average hourly
compensation deflated by the CPI-U, the Consumer Price Index
for Urban consumers) grew by only 1.5 %. One possible
explanation for this gap is that foreigners may have been
"appropriating" some of this output gain through rising import
prices. Our analysis indicates, however, that this explanation can
be rejected in favor of a more straightforward one which involves
the basket of goods used to deflate things. First, we point out that
the CPI-U is a basket of consumption goods, but the output per
worker is deflated by the price of a basket of producer goods. If
we deflate nominal compensation by the output deflator used in
the business-output measures of productivity, we find that
between 1979 and 1991 real product compensation actually
increased by 9.5%--basically the same as the increase in output
per worker. Thus, deflating wages with the appropriate prices
eliminates the output-wage gap. Second, we analyze whether
rising prices for imports (which are consumed in the U.S. but not
consumed here) caused the faster growth in consumption prices.
We fmd that they did not: real consumption compensation growth
lagged behind real product compensation because of a rise in the
relative price of housing (which workers consume but do not
produce) and a decline in the relative price of investment goods
(which workers produce but do not consume). Thus, our main
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finding is that trade had nothing to do with the slow increase in
average real compensation.
In the second section of the paper, we consider the rise in

the relative wages of non-production workers.

Standard

international-trade theory, as laid out by Stolper and Samuelson,
suggests .that changes in the relative returns of factors will reflect
changes in the prices of the goods that they produce. International
trade thus redistributes income by changing the terms of trade.
Many studies of relative wage performance have ignored this
process, however. Instead, they focus on trade volumes and trade
deficits. As Bhagwati (1991) has emphasized, trade deficits are
not the most suitable measures of the effects of trade because they
are not necessarily associated with relative wage behavior. We
focus instead on the behavior of traded-goods prices. All other
things equal, in the Stolper-Samuelson framework a rising relative
wage of skilled labor is triggered by an increase in the
international price of skilled-labor intensive products relative to
those of unskilled- labor-intensive products. When we look at
America's terms of trade over the 1980's, however, we do not
find this. In fact, the relative price of non-productionlabor-intensive products fell slightly, indicating that the
Stolper-Samuelson process actually nudged relative wages
towards greater equality. From this evidence, we conclude that
relative wages were not driven by the Stolper-Samuelson process.
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We do, however, find a positive association between
total-factor productivity growth and the intensive use of
non-production labor. This points to technological change as the
major source of relative wage changes: under the assumption of
given prices, Hicks-neutral technological change occurring more
rapidly in the non-production-Iabor-intensive industries should
increase the relative wage of non-production labor. Indeed, we
argue that the pervasive decline in the ratio of production to
non-production workers actually employed--despite the decline in
the relative wages of production workers--points to a large role
for technological change which has augmented employment of
non-production workers. This accords well with anecdotal
evidence of the shift toward computer-controlled flexible
manufacturing systems and with recent work by Berman, Bound,
and Griliches (1992) (who find strong correlations between skill
upgrading within industries and with increased spending by firms
on computers and R&D), Krueger (1991) (who estimates that
from one- to two-thirds of the 1984-89 increase in the premium
on education was related to the use of computers), and Bartel and
Lichtenberg (1991) (who find that industries which use young
technologies pay a premium wage).
In conclusion, we fmd that international trade contributed
basically nothing to America's average and relative wage
performance in the 1980's. Instead, developments on the domestic
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side of the economy--sluggish productivity growth in the service
sector and skill-biased technological change--seem to have
mattered the most.

Chapter 2

International Trade, Multinational Corporations,
and American Wage Divergence in the 1980's

In this chapter I revisit the fact that the wages of
less-skilled Americans fell sharply in the 1980's relative to those
of their more-skilled counterparts. First, I extend the work of the
first chapter on international trade and relative wages by
analyzing under what conditions the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
is empirically relevant. Second, I study the contribution to the
wage divergence of outsourcing: a variety of foreign direct
investment which decomposes existing production techniques and
shifts unskilled-intensive activities to foreign countries.
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem originally was and
usually is stated in the classic "2x2x2 model with two countries,
II

two goods, two factors of production, and a host of other
simplifying assumptions. In this framework the theorem is quite
strong: a rise in the international price of one good will
unambiguously raise the real wage of the factor used intensively
in the production of that good and will unambiguously lower the
real wage of the other factor. For empirical work, the crucial
question is how the Stolper-Samuelson theorem generalizes to
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more realistic frameworks. In the previous chapter, we largely
assumed that the theorem easily applies to the activity in the
1980's. Here, I analyze the theorem more rigorously by
considering two important extensions. First, I introduce higher
dimensions; then I introduce increasing returns to scale.
First, introduce more factors and goods. With either more
than two factors or many factors and goods, the theorem cannot
make unambiguous predictions about real-wage changes.
However, the strong Stolper-Samuelson theorem does have a
higher-dimension generalization which makes predictions about
relative wages without restrictive assumptions. Ethier (1984)
states it as follows: "there is a tendency for changes in relative
commodity prices to be accompanied by increases in the rewards
of factors employed most intensively by those goods whose prices
have relatively risen the most and employed least intensively by
those goods whose relative prices have fallen the most." This
generalization follows directly from cost minimization, and
therefore requires no restrictions on technology or dimensionality.
Moreover, just like the

strong Stolper-Samuelson, this

generalization involves shifting demands for factors of production
across industries and shifting relative employment within
industries.
The second extension allows one or more of the industries
to produce under increasing returns to scale. Helpman and
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Krugman (1985) point out that this introduces a second channel
through which trade can affect the utility of factors. Notice the
use of "utility of factors" rather than factor prices: in a broad
class of models summarized in Helpman and Krugman, this
second channel does not operate on factor prices per se but rather
on the utHity of the owners these factors through an increase in
available product variety. Distinct from this variety effect,
Stolper-Samuelson still moves factor prices in these models (one
of which I analyze more completely).
Thus, generalizing the 2x2x2 framework to allow higher
dimensions and increasing returns to scale changes the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem only slightly. Instead of predictions
about real-wage movements, it now makes predictions about
relative-wage movements. The generalized theorem says that a
rise in the price of a group of products tends to raise the wage of
the factors used relatively intensively in these products relative to
the wages of the factors used relatively unintensively in these
products. Insofar as the concern is explaining shifts in relative
wages in the U.S. in the 1980's, this theorem is a very relevant
one for studying the effects of international trade on relative
wages.
The second half of this chapter analyzes the role of
multinational outsourcing. There is a good deal of anecdotal
evidence that outsourcing was widespread during the 1980's. Its
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effects, however, are less clear. Some think it harms the V.S.
economy (for example, a 1986 Business Week special report
warned that outsourcing is creating "hollow corporations" in
America), in particular by forcing American labor to compete
more directly against foreign labor.
To study the relevance of outsourcing, I first develop a
model of multinational outsourcing which follows Helpman
(1984). The key result of this and similar models is that when
fIrms face international factor-price differentials, they will spread
facilities across countries (Le., they will employ factors in more
than one country, and by defInition become multinational). This
changes within-industry relative factor demands in these
countries, which in turn changes each country's overall relative
demand and overall relative wages. Thus, outsourcing actually
expands the factor-price equalization set that was attainable under
trade alone. After solving and describing the analytic solution to
this general model of outsourcing, I then run numerical
simulations of it to show how it generates within-industry relative
wage and employment shifts like those observed in the V.S.
Second, I then test predictions of this model using data
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis on the activity of all V. S.
multinationals--both

domestic

parents

and

foreign

subsidiaries--from 1977 through 1989. My primary finding is that
these data are inconsistent with V. S. multinationals having
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outsourced more heavily in the 1980's. I generate a set of stylized
facts and find that many are inconsistent with increased
outsourcing.

For

example,

outsourcing

should

raise

production-worker employment in American subsidiaries, or at
least lower the ratio of non-production to production employment.
The data do not display either of these trends. Instead, the
majority of countries and industries had falling levels of
production employment and rising ratios of non-production to
production employment. Indeed, these two facts mirror the trends
seen in America. The similarity between employment trends in
subsidiaries and in America is consistent with the same force(s)
operating worldwide--for example, skill-biased technological
change. This is not to say that outsourcing did not happen at all.
A few industries such as computers and office products (SIC
#357) do seem to have outsourced heavily. But these are the
exception rather than the rule. In addition to these stylized facts,
I estimate the pattern of factor demands for multinationals by
fitting a trans log cost function to their production patterns to
determine their cross elasticity of demand between home and
foreign unskilled labor. Contrary to the outsourcing model, I find
that home and foreign unskilled labor at best are weak price
substitutes and very likely are price complements.
In conclusion, I find that neither international trade
through the Stolper-Samuelson process nor outsourcing by
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multinational corporations contributed significantly to America's
labor-demand shift and resulting relative-wage divergence.

Chapter 3

The Antebellum Transportation Revolution and
Factor-Price Equalization

The first two chapters of my dissertation found little
evidence of the international economy's effect on American factor
markets in the 1980's. In the third chapter I apply the same basic
methods to another episode, antebellum America. In antebellum
America an extensive network of canals and railroads was
constructed which slashed transportation costs between the
Northeast and the Midwest. This "transportation revolution"
presents an excellent case study of the factor-price equalization
(FPE) theorem, which says that under certain conditions when
trade equalizes commodity prices across regions it also equalizes
factor prices as well. This is a good case for at least three
reasons. It represents a clear shock to an existing trading regime
(where the "countries" are regions in the United States); it avoids
the difficult question of what exchange rates to use to convert
prices into a common currency; and it uses new regional
factor-price data recently assembled by Margo and Villaflor
(1987) and Goldin and Margo (1992) from records of United
States Army posts.

52

International-trade economists have historically had a
rather schizophrenic attitude toward the FPE theorem. In
theoretical work the FPE theorem has been studied for decades,
and it has been shown to be a robust idea which holds in a wide
variety of models. In empirical work, however, the FPE theorem
has. been largely ignored. One possible explanation of this
schizophrenia is that people have thought about FPE only as an
eqUilibrium outcome in isolation from the assumptions which
generate it. From this perspective, the appropriate empirical test
for FPE is simply whether factor prices are equal across regions.
On this criterion FPE is a spectacular failure. If this explanation
is correct, then I argue that people have been evaluating FPE too
strictly. One should consider not only FPE but also its motivating
assumptions, because in most models it requires stringent
assumptions which almost certainly do not all hold in reality.
Thinking about FPE as not only an equilibrium outcome but also
as a set of stringent assumptions motivates an alternative empirical
approach to FPE. One can look for a tendency towards FPE that
is motivated by a tendency towards realizing its stringent
assumptions. The focus thus switches from factor prices alone at
one point in time to the interaction between trends over time in
the assumptions needed to equalize factor prices and trends over
time in the prices themselves. This is the approach I adopt in this
chapter.
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To look for FPE, first I document how canals and
railroads cut transportation costs and thereby helped equalize
commodity prices across regions. My transportation-cost data are
largely anecdotal, but they indicate drastic drops on the order of
25 % to 95 %. The commodity-price data I assemble from raw data
collected by Cole (1938). Price ratios which measure prices
between the Northeast and the Midwest for several narrowly
defined commodities converge strongly towards one between
1820 and 1860. This convergence is a necessary precondition for
factor prices in turn to equalize. Next, I analyze regional wage
series to see whether factor prices were also converging.
Surprisingly, they were not. Wage ratios which measure wages
between the Northeast and the Midwest for three types of labor
(artisans, clerks, and laborers) show basically no first-order or
second-order convergence between 1820 and 1860. Thus, the data
reveal a puzzle. The transportation revolution equalized regional
commodity prices but not regional factor prices.
Finally, I propose a simple explanation for this puzzle:
regional specialization of production in the Midwest. To support
this explanation I present production data from U. S. censuses.
The data show that even in 1850 and 1860, the Midwest
effectively produced only agricultural products whereas the
Northeast produced both agricultural and manufactured products.
I then present both analytically and diagramatically a simple
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model in which the nature of regional factor demands depends on
whether the region specializes in production. The key result is
that specialization breaks the link between converging product
prices and converging factor prices. Because of specialization,
commodity-price equalization does not induce the standard shifts
in regional factor demands needed to equalize factor prices as
well. So even though trade barriers were falling, regional
specialization of production could have prevented these falling
barriers from equalizing factor prices. After presenting the model,
I also discuss how regional specialization of production can
explain several other stylized facts such as regional divergence of
interest rates.
In conclusion, I find that canals and railroads generated
strong commodity-price equalization across regions but that this
equalization did not lead to FPE--arguably because the Midwest
was specialized in agriculture production. This finding is a good
empirical example of the theoretical result that the FPE theorem
is strictly a static-equilibrium condition which requires several
preconditions. It is not a comparative-static proposition with
unambiguous out-of-equilibrium predictions.
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Conclusion

The overall finding of my dissertation is that in episodes
where strong prima facie evidence pointed to a role for either
trade or multinationals in the level and distribution of wages in the
U.S. labor market, this evidence was not supported by more
rigorous empirical analysis.
In light of this, U.S. policy aiming to restrict trade or FDI
because of their believed labor-market effects seems unwarranted
at this time. Two points are of relevance here. First, making this
point may be difficult given the presumption on the part of many
in the policy debate--such as Ross Perot--that globalization is
harming the U.S. labor market in some way. But second and
more importantly, even if trade and FDI were influencing wage
patterns, restrictions on them would not be the least distortionary
policy response. Income subsidies or tax breaks for those
adversely affected would distort fewer margins in the economy
and thus cause a smaller overall efficiency loss.

56

References

Bartel Ann P. and Frank R. Lichtenberg, "The Age of
Technology and its Impact on Employee Wages"
Economic Innovation and New Technology 1:2, 215-231,
1991.
Berman, Eli, John Bound, and Zvi Griliches, "Changes in the
Demand for Skilled Labor Within U.S. Manufacturing
Industries: Evidence from the Annual Survey of
Manufacturing," Harvard University mimeograph,
December 1992.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, "Free Traders and Free Immigrationists:
Strangers or Friends?" Working Paper No. 20, Russel
Sage Foundation, April 1991.
Cole, Arthur H., Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United
States, 1700-1861, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1938.
Davis, Steven J., "Cross-Country Patterns of Change in Relative
Wages," in Olivier J. Blanchard and Stanley Fischer
(eds) , 1992 Macroeconomics Annual, NBER, 1992.
Ethier, Wilfred J., "Higher Dimensional Issues in Trade Theory" ,
in R.W. Jones and P.B. Kenen (eds) , Handbook of
International Economics, Volume 1, North Holland,
1984.
Goldin, Claudia and Margo, Robert A., "Wages, Prices, and
Labor Markets Before the Civil War," in Claudia Goldin
and Hugh Rockoff (eds) Strategic Factors in 19th Century
American Economic History, University of Chicago
Press: Chicago, 1992, pp 67-104.

57

Helpman, Elhanan, "A Simple Theory of International Trade with
Multinational Corporations," Journal of Political
Economy, 92, 1984, No.3, 451-471.
Helpman, Elhanan and Paul R. Krugman, Market Structure and
Foreign Trade, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985.
Krueger, Alan B. "How Computers Have Changed the Wage
Structure: Evidence from Microdata, 1984-89," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, June 1992, 35-77.
Margo, Robert A. and Villaflor, Georgia C., "The Growth of
Wages in Antebellum America: New Evidence," The
Journal of Economic History, Volume 47, Number 4,
1987, pp 873-895.

58

